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3The Unified Court on Patents: 
The New Oxymoron of European Law
FRANKLIN DEHOUSSE1
The creation of the unified patent court could be perceived by many observers
of European affairs as an extremely specialized debate, which has produced a
highly complex compromise after decades of negotiations. This perception is
correct, but incomplete. This creation will also have multiple systemic impacts
on the general institutional system of the European Union.
This is quite understandable. We have not seen often in the past the application
of EU law being entrusted to an international agency, established by a treaty
between the Member States and third countries, and judicial review of EU law
entrusted to an international court, established by a treaty between Member
States. Additionally, the joint use of enhanced cooperation regulations and an
international treaty to accomplish a goal of the single market is unusual, not to
say unprecedented.
This paper endeavours very modestly to examine the possible systemic conse-
quences of this situation, for those of us who have devoted their daily life to EU
affairs in general rather than to patents in particular. It does NOT aim to
provide a detailed comment about the substantive provisions of the two EU
enhanced cooperation regulations and the Unified Patent Court Agreement
(UPCA), or about the compatibility of the chosen approach with Article 118
TFEU, or about the future functioning of the new patent regime. After a very
quick reminder of the never-ending quest for a truly integrated patent (§ 1), of
Opinion 1/09 of the Court of Justice (§ 2), and of the approach adopted by the
Member States after this Opinion (§ 3), it will briefly consider the impact of
those texts, if they are finally implemented, for EU patent law (§ 4), the EU
institutional system (§ 5) and the EU courts system (§ 6).
1. The author is Professor (in abeyance) at the University of Liège and judge at the Court of Justice of the
European Union (General Court). This comment is strictly personal. Documents have been taken into
consideration until 31 October 2013.
This is a revised version of a September 2013 draft.

5§ 1. THE NEVER-ENDING QUEST FOR A TRULY
INTEGRATED PATENT
Patents sometimes seem a doomed area of European integration. Since the signa-
ture of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the creation of a truly integrated patent
(long called the “Community patent”) has remained an elusive objective. In a
single market dedicated to the free circulation of goods and services, growth and
innovation, this was nonetheless considered an essential objective. However, the
creation of such an integrated property right has met an incredible and perpet-
ually renewed flow of obstacles – be they institutional, linguistic, or financial.
The “Community patent” (now become the “EU patent”), still inexistent,
should have been a single ownership right covering an invention. It would have
been quite similar to the Community trademark or the Community design. This
project must be distinguished from the “European patent”. This one exists, and
is based on the 1973 Munich Convention on the European patent (EPC). It
remains a strictly international instrument and covers both EU and non EU
states2.
The Munich Convention has established the European Patents Office (EPO).
The Office allows the patent holder to obtain a bundle of national patents on
the basis of harmonized criteria. This bundle is flexible and covers only the
countries designated by the patent holder. The Convention has thus provided a
single evaluation of an alleged innovation. However, it provides only a title, and
not a single right. The patent must still be registered (and often translated) in the
different States concerned. This is “a common attribution process completed by
a State per State validation”3. The system remains moderately efficient.
According to the Commission’s evaluations of 2007, it may be up to nine times
more expensive than the existing system in the United States or Japan4. In 2003,
an international agreement was concluded to crown this international regime
with a single judicial authority. The agreement did not gather much support.
This situation explains the recurrence of proposals aiming to create a Commu-
nity patent5. First, the strategy in this domain relied on an international agree-
ment. The first draft of a convention on the Community patent was signed in
19756. The second draft was adopted in 19897. In 2000, the strategy changed
and the Commission tried to use a true Community instrument based on the EC
2. http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/f/ma1.html.
3. N. Binctin, Droit de la propriété intellectuelle, 2ème éd., 2012, p. 384.
4. COM (2007) 165.
5. For an excellent narrative of these proposals, see T. Jaeger, The EU patent – cui bono et quo vadit?, 47
C.M.L.R. 63-115 (2010).
6. OJ L 17, 26. 1. 1976, p. 1-28.
7. OJ L 401, 30. 12. 1989, p. 1-27.
THE UNIFIED COURT ON PATENTS: THE NEW OXYMORON OF EUROPEAN LAW
6
Treaty. A first proposal for a regulation was accordingly presented in 2000, and
covered both the grant procedure and the litigation aspects8. In 2007, the
Commission submitted a second proposal9. In that new strategy too, the crea-
tion of a single judiciary authority supervising the implementation of the legal
regime appeared necessary. Here too, the proposition failed.
These repeated failures reveal the great difficulties of the endeavour10. The crea-
tion of the EU patent must intervene in a broader setting, already complex and
already productive. Due to its efficiency, this setting has to be preserved.
Furthermore, the language question remains extremely sensitive. Article 118
TFEU, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, has provided a more specific legal basis
for the creation of European intellectual property rights. However, if these rights
can be established following the ordinary legislative procedure, the language
rules must be established according to a special legislative procedure, requiring
the unanimity of the Council and the simple consultation of the European
Parliament.
In 2009, the negotiation turned again. A political compromise was found in the
Council on different essential elements. It implied the adoption of an interna-
tional instrument establishing a European patent court. This agreement was
intended to be concluded by the European Union, its Member States, and a
number of third countries linked to the European Patent system. It would have
covered both the “European” patent and the “Community” patent. As this
agreement was to be concluded by the European Union, the Council considered
it opportune to request an Opinion of the Court of Justice, as foreseen by Article
218 TFEU11.
8. OJ C 337 E, 28. 11. 2000, p. 278-290.
9. COM (2007) 165.final, 3. 4. 2007.
10. One observer evokes even a “mission impossible”: see M. Troncoso, European Union patents: a mis-
sion impossible? An assessment of the historical and current approaches, 17 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev.
231-263.
11. Formerly Art. 300 TEC.
7§ 2. OPINION 1/09 OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE:
THE RETURN OF OPINION 1/91
The question asked to the Court was quite similar to the one asked in 1991 on
the creation of an international court in the framework of the European
Economic Area12. This was the origin of Opinion 1/9113. In that Opinion, the
Court had acknowledged the capacity of the European Community to submit
itself to the decisions of such an international court. This however was subject
to the fundamental condition that the judicial functions established by the Trea-
ties could not be altered. According to the Court of Justice, the draft negotiated
by the signatory States did not fulfil that condition14. Accordingly, they negoti-
ated a new agreement (see Article 111 of the EEA agreement). This new version
was submitted again to the Court of Justice15.
This paper does not examine at length the reasoning of Opinion 1/0916. The
Court of Justice first examined the admissibility of the request for its Opinion,
considering the level of progress of the negotiations, and the various intentions
manifested by the Member States. It rejected easily certain arguments invoking
the incompatibility of the proposed new judicial system with Articles 262 and
344 TFEU. Furthermore, it emphasized the essential characteristics of the legal
order and the judicial system of the European Union (§§ 67 to 70). “It is for the
12. For a recent global description of this topic, see M. Parish, International Courts and the European
Legal Order, 23EJIL 141-153 (2012).
13. Opinion 1/91 of 14 December 1991 delivered pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 228 (1)
of the Treaty – Draft agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the Euro-
pean Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European Economic Area.
14. About this opinion, see among many comments D. Simon; A. Rigaux: L’avis de la Cour de justice sur
le projet d’accord CEE/AELE portant création de l’Espace économique européen (EEE), Europe, Février
1992, n° 2, p.1-4; M.-A. Gaudissart: La portée des avis 1/91 et 1/92 de la Cour de justice des Communau-
tés européennes relatifs à la création de l’Espace Economique Européen. Entre autonomie et homogénéité:
l’ordre juridique communautaire en péril…, Revue du marché unique européen 1992, n° 2, p.121-136;
H.G. Schermers.: Opinion 1/91 of the Court of Justice, 14 December 1991; Opinion 1/92 of the Court of
Justice, 10 April 1992, Common Market Law Review 1992, n° 5, p.991-1009; T.C.Hartley: The Euro-
pean Court and the EEA, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1992, p.841-848; J.L. Da Cruz
Vilaça; N. Piçarra: Y a-t-il des limites matérielles à la révision des traités instituant les communautés
européennes?, Cahiers de droit européen, 1993, n° 1-2, p.3-37; R. Barents: The Court of Justice and the
EEA Agreement: Between Constitutional Values and Political Realities, The European Economic Area
EC-EFTA. European Monographs (Ed. Kluwer – Deventer), 1994, Vol.7, p.57-71.
15. Opinion 1/92 of the Court of 10 April 1992 pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 228 (1)
of the EEC Treaty – Draft agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the
European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European Economic Area.
16. See S. Adam, Le mécanisme préjudiciel, limite fonctionnelle à la compétence externe de l’Union. Note
sur l’avis 1/09 de la Cour de justice, Cahiers de droit européen, Vol. 47, N° 1, 2011, p. 227-302, D.
Simon, Avis négatif sur le projet de création d’une juridiction des brevets: (CJUE, ass. plén., avis n. 1/09, 8
mars 2011), Europe: actualité du droit communautaire, Vol. 21, N° 5, 2011, p. 4-7, M.C.A. Kant, A spe-
cialized Patent Court for Europe? An analysis of Opinion 1/09 of the Court of Justice of the European
Union from 8 March 2011 concerning the establishment of a European and Community Patents Court
and a proposal for an alternative solution, Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht, Editie 2012.2, p. 193-
201 et J.-F. Guillot et C. de Haas, La malediction s’acharne sur le projet de brevet européen à effet uni-
taire, Contratto e impresa / Europa, N° 2, 2012, p. 543-556.
THE UNIFIED COURT ON PATENTS: THE NEW OXYMORON OF EUROPEAN LAW
8
Court to ensure respect for the autonomy of the European Union legal order
thus created by the Treaties”.
The major innovation brought by Opinion 1/09 is probably the emphasis put on
the central role of national courts in the implementation of the EU law (§ 68 to
70 of the Opinion)17. From this point of view, the draft agreement had different
particularities (§ 72)18. Therefore, “the envisaged agreement, by conferring on
an international court which is outside the institutional and judicial framework
of the European Union an exclusive jurisdiction to hear a significant number of
actions brought by individuals in the field of the Community patent and to inter-
pret and apply European Union law in that field, would deprive courts of
Member States of their powers in relation to the interpretation and application
of European Union law and the Court of its powers to reply, by preliminary
ruling, to questions referred by those courts and, consequently, would alter the
essential character of the powers which the Treaties confer on the institutions of
the European Union and on the Member States and which are indispensable to
the preservation of the very nature of European Union law” (§ 89).
From the point of view of EU external relations law, the first lesson of Opinion
1/09 is that it clearly confirms the conclusions of Opinion 1/91. The creation of
an international court in the framework of an external agreement of the EU
remains a difficult endeavour. As K. Baudenbacher has emphasized, the EEA
court remains the only non EU/Member States court19.
There remains an interesting hypothetical question. Considering the institu-
tional guarantees integrated in the UPCA after the Opinion of the Court of
Justice, could the formula of a EU/Member States/Third states agreement have
been maintained? One can suspect that the answer would have remained nega-
tive. The mechanisms established by Articles 20 to 24 of the final agreement
offer a sufficient guarantee only because they integrate themselves in “a
complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to ensure review of
the legality of acts of the institutions”, as described by Opinion 1/09. Third
17. “The Member States are obliged, by reason, inter alia, of the principle of sincere cooperation, set out
in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) TEU, to ensure, in their respective territories, the application of
and respect for European Union law (…) it is for the national courts and tribunals and for the Court of
Justice to ensure the full application of European Union law in all Member States and to ensure judicial
protection of an individual’s rights under that law” “The national court, in collaboration with the Court
of Justice, fulfils a duty entrusted to them both of ensuring that in the interpretation and application of
the Treaties the law is observed”. Finally, “The judicial system of the European Union is moreover a com-
plete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to ensure review of the legality of acts of the insti-
tutions”.
18. For a more detailed analysis on this point, see R. Baratta, National courts as guardians and ordinary
courts of EU law: Opinion 1/09 of the ECJ, 38 Legal issues of European Integration 297-320 (2011); A.
Rosas, The national judge as EU judge: Opinion 1/09, in “Constitutionalising the EU Judicial System” –
Essays in Honour of Pernilla Lindh – Pascal Cardonnel, Allan Rosas and Nils Wahl eds., Hart Publishing
2012.
19. K. Baudenbacher, The EFTA Court remains the only Non-EU-Member States Court – Observations
on opinion 1/09, European Law Reporter, 2011, N° 7-8, p. 236-242.
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States would not have been part of such an ensemble, and thus could not offer
the same guarantees. Furthermore, it would most likely have been complicated
for them to establish an international court which would have been mandated
to ensure the primacy of EU law.
Some points of Opinion 1/09 have been interpreted as suggesting the contrary,
notably when it evokes the precedent of the Benelux Court. This example had
been presented later as an acceptable alternative solution during the negotiation
in the Council. However, this precedent was in reality quite far from the ambi-
tions of the creators of the unified patent court20.
20. See the excellent comparison between the two concepts by T. Jaeger, Back to square one? An assess-
ment of the latest proposals for a patent and court for the internal market and possible alternatives, Inter-
national review of international property and competition law, 2012, pp. 286 and foll. This is also
covered by J. Pagenberg, Little hope for an EU patent court after the CJ opinion, pp. 6-8, whose conclu-
sions are validly refuted by W. Tilmann: HC 1799 UK House of commons European Scrutiny Committee,
Written evidence received from Professor Dr Winfried Tilmann, 65th report session 2010-12, volume II,
w9.
The perception in the Commission and the Council at the time seemed less clear.

11
§ 3. THE RESULTING CONCLUSION OF AN
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE MEMBER STATES
After Opinion 1/09, the negotiations were re-launched. Basically, the Opinion
allowed three options for the Member States21. They could: (a) transfer patent
jurisdiction to the Court of Justice of the European Union; (b) transfer it to the
national courts or (c) create a special international court through an interna-
tional agreement. According to the Commission at that time, “the first two
options would appear not to meet the political requirements of the Member
States and the interests of the users of the patent system. Member States have
expressed in the past their opposition to the first option, i.e. to confer jurisdic-
tion on the CJEU. Moreover, this option would not allow for the creation of a
unified patent jurisdiction because the CJEU may not be entrusted with the juris-
diction on disputes relating to ‘classical’ European patents. This is one of the
reasons why the users of the patent system are opposed to such a solution. This
resulted clearly from the Commission’s consultation on the future patent policy
in 2006 and has ever since been confirmed by the users of the patent system on
various occasions. The second option, leaving the jurisdiction on the unitary
patent protection to national courts, as in the trade mark area, would most
likely not be acceptable to most Member States and industry” 22.
Finally, a political agreement was concluded, comprising of two enhanced coop-
eration regulations and one international agreement (the so-called “unitary
patent package”). Regulation 1257/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 17 December 2012 implements enhanced cooperation in the area
of the creation of a unitary patent23. Regulation 1260/2012/EU of 17 December
2012 does the same with regard to the applicable translation arrangements24.
They cover all Member States, with the exception of Italy and Spain. The inter-
national agreement (UPCA) was signed on 13 February 2013 by most of the
21. One will find very interesting presentations about the possible options in M. Kant, A specialised pat-
ent court for Europe, 30 Netherlands Internationaal Privaatrecht 193-201 (2012) and S. Peers, The con-
stitutional implications of the EU patent. 7 European Constitutional Law Review 229-266 (2011).
22. Informal Commission document annexed to Council document 10630/11, 26 May 2011.
23. OJ EU L 361, 31.12.2012, p. 1-8
24. OJ EU L 361, 31.12.2012, p. 89-92
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Member States. Finally, Italy signed it, but Poland did not and is thus now in the
same category with Spain25.
This agreement establishes the unified patent court completely outside the EU
framework. It is described as unified since it deals both with unified patents
(which are, as we shall see, a strongly weakened version of the former Commu-
nity patents) and European patents. In a nutshell, the unified patent court will
deal mainly with issues of patent validity and infringement. This agreement may
be signed by all Member States, including those which have decided not to
participate in the enhanced cooperation established by Regulation 1257 and
1260/2012/EU (art. 84 § 4). The agreement will enter into force after the 13th
ratification, provided it benefits from the ratification of the three most impor-
tant Member States in the field of patents (Germany, France and the United
Kingdom). The entry into force also requires preliminary amendments to Regu-
lation 1215/2012/EU concerning its relationship with the agreement (Art. 89)26.
In any case, it cannot happen before 1 January 2014.
This agreement contains many institutional and legal innovations. From the
point of view of Opinion 1/09, the first of them is the huge number of guarantees
provided by the signatories to escape any additional criticism from the Court of
Justice. Firstly, this international agreement is now limited to EU Member States
only. Secondly, a few provisions have been introduced into chapter IV to safe-
guard the full application of EU law.
For example, according to Article 20, “the Court shall apply Union law in its
entirety and shall respect its primacy”. According to Article 21, “As a court
common to the Contracting Member States and as part of their judicial system,
the Court shall cooperate with the Court of Justice of the European Union to
ensure the correct application and uniform interpretation of Union law, as any
national court, in accordance with Article 267 TFEU in particular. Decisions of
the Court of Justice of the European Union shall be binding on the Court.” The
traditional rules about prejudicial rulings thus apply. Furthermore, article 22
establishes a collective liability for Member States in case of infringement of
25. http://www.unified-patent-court.org/committee-members (accessed 4 August 2013).
This engenders a superb institutional conundrum. Though Poland is a member of the enhanced coopera-
tion, by way of Article 18 § 2 of Regulation 1257/2012, “a European patent for which unitary effect is
registered in the Register for unitary patent protection shall have unitary effect only in those participating
Member States in which the Unified Patent Court has exclusive jurisdiction with regard to European pat-
ents with unitary effect at the date of registration”.
26. Regulation 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351/1) aims at determining the international jurisdiction of the courts of
the Member States and preventing parallel proceedings before the courts of different Member States. It
also lays down rules for the recognition and enforcement of judgments of national courts in other Mem-
ber States. The amendments are twofold. First, the amendments must ensure compliance between the
UPC Agreement and the Regulation, and second they must cover the particular issue of jurisdiction rules
concerning defendants in non-EU States.
The amendments have been presented in July 2013: see COM (2013) 554.
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Union law by the Court of appeal27. According to Article 23, “Actions of the
Court are directly attributable to each Contracting Member State individually,
including for the purposes of Articles 258, 259 and 260 TFEU, and to all
Contracting Member States collectively”. Furthermore, Article 24 concerning
the sources of law contains an explicit reference to EU law.
In other words, although this text is no longer an external agreement of the
European Union, the Member States have tried to integrate as fully as possible
the guarantees for the protection of the EU system of law that the Court wanted
to impose. This, in itself, already constitutes an important precedent. The use of
an international agreement to implement EU legal provisions is certainly not a
usual process, especially when these provisions are themselves adopted
according to an exceptional procedure. This remark is all the more valid if one
considers that we are dealing here with the judicial implementation of those EU
provisions, and still more essential if this specific international judicial system,
though autonomous, is nonetheless submitted to a measure of review by the
Court of Justice as any national court28. This review is however certainly not
easy, since it relies at the end on a collective liability of the Member States.
Furthermore, in the present context, such a specific instrument could provoke
important difficulties in its functioning, and later in its adaptation.
27. “(1) The Contracting Member States are jointly and severally liable for damage resulting from an
infringement of Union law by the Court of Appeal, in accordance with Union law concerning non-con-
tractual liability of Member States for damage caused by their national courts breaching Union law.(2.)
An action for such damages shall be brought against the Contracting Member State where the claimant
has its residence or principal place of business or, in the absence of residence or principal place of busi-
ness, place of business, before the competent authority of that Contracting Member State. Where the
claimant does not have its residence, or principal place of business or, in the absence of residence or prin-
cipal place of business, place of business in a Contracting Member State, the claimant may bring such an
action against the Contracting Member State where the Court of Appeal has its seat, before the competent
authority of that Contracting Member State. The competent authority shall apply the lex fori, with the
exception of its private international law, to all questions not regulated by Union law or by this Agree-
ment. The claimant shall be entitled to obtain the entire amount of damages awarded by the competent
authority from the Contracting Member State against which the action was brought. (3.) The Contracting
Member State that has paid damages is entitled to obtain proportional contribution, established in
accordance with the method laid down in Article 37(3) and (4), from the other Contracting Member
States. The detailed rules governing the Contracting Member States’ contribution under this paragraph
shall be determined by the Administrative Committee”.
28. Revealingly, the legal service of the Council’s secretariat had expressed a doubt at the time about the
conformity of the chosen approach to the EU Treaties. “It could be argued at the outset that, following
the ERTA case (case 22/70, 1971, ECR 263), the validity of such an agreement is questionnable, since it
will concern a – by exercise exclusive competence of the Union, ie civil jurisdiction (see Regulation 44/
2001 – Brussels – and the Lugano Convention, as well as Regulation 593/2008 – Rome I –, Regulation
864/2007 – Rome II – and Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights). The
answer to this argument could be that the Union’s exclusive competence applies only to agreements with
third states and not between Member States alone (see wording of Article 216 TFUE). It could then be
considered that agreements between Member States may affect provisions of the Union law in so far as
they are compatible with them.” (Doc. Council 15856/11, 21 october 2011, p. 10, note 23) (accessed 5
March 2012).
The followed approach could then possibly provoke the paradoxical result that Member States are more
constrained in the respect of the EU competences when they conclude an external international agreement
with third States than when they conclude such an agreement only between them.
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Finally, it must be underlined that the agreement contains a number of substan-
tive rules concerning patents, alongside those of Regulation 1257/2012/EU.
Articles 6 to 8 of the draft unitary patent regulation regulated the right to
prevent direct or indirect use of the invention, and the limitation of the effects
of the unitary patent. This provoked growing opposition in some circles. It
“started in the Expert Committee of the Commission where the UK position,
since a long time skeptically observing the growing influence of the ECJ practice
on the national courts, met support from other members. It coincided with a
certain frustration of the members when the political actors (Council, Parlia-
ment) took over the steering-wheel, reducing the influence of the Expert
Committee. Both motives combined resulted in a furor which, like a bush-fire,
soon jumped over to the European Patent Lawyers Association (EPLAW), the
Venice Judges Meeting 2011, a UK Group submitting a Paper on Principle
Objections, large enterprises, the ICC, the American Chamber of Commerce,
the CBEE, FICPI and others and to a small group of Member States in the
Council (UK, Sweden, Finland).”29
The opposition’s arguments were based on a vivid distrust of the European
Court of Justice. We’ll come back to them later. They were synthetized in
different documents. One of them, often cited, was provided by Professor R.
Krasser30. Another illustration was provided by Dr. J. Pagenberg31. They were
countered by another document by Professor W. Tilmann32, and also in some
aspects by various comments coming from members of the Max Planck Insti-
tute33. Among the counter-arguments one can find the alleged incompatibility of
such a solution with Article 118 TFEU, which is not covered here34. One can
find thousands of comments on various websites35.
29. HC 1799 UK House of commons European Scrutiny Committee, Written evidence received from Pro-
fessor Dr Winfried Tilmann, 65th report session 2010-12, volume II, w9.
30. Effects of an inclusion of regulations concerning the content and limits of the patent holder’s rights to
prohibit in an EU regulation for the creation of unitary European patent protection, 18 October 2011.
http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/2011/October/Opinion%20Prof%20Krasser%20EN.pdf (accessed 27
June 2013)
31. The EU patent package – Politics vs. Quality and the new practice of secret legislation, http://
www.ipeg.eu/wp-content/uploads/Pagenberg-The-EU-Patent-Package-_Article_.pdf (accessed 21 August
2013).
32. See note 29.
33. See for example R. Hilty, T. Jaeger, M. Lamping and H. Ullrich, The unitary patent package: twelve
reasons for concern, Max Planck Institute, 2012.
34. See also the interrogation of F. de Visscher, European Unified Patent Court: another more realistic and
more equitable approach should be examined, GRUR Int 2012, p. 214.
35. See for example V. Metzler, In defence of Articles 6 to 9 of the unitary patent regulation, 19 March
2012 http://blog.ksnh.eu/en/2012/03/19/in-defense-of-Articles-6-to-9-of-the-proposed-unitary-patent-reg-
ulation (accessed 27 August 2013). Pace Tolkien, an especially colourful comment is: Only Gandalf can
protect Europe from the unitary patent https://www.unitary-patent.eu/content/only-gandalf-can-protect-
europe-unitary-patent (accessed 15 August 2013).
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§ 4. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PATENT LAW
4.1. Substantive law
Many non-specialised lawyers could have difficulty in grasping the new regime.
EU Patent law (broadly defined) is now based on two enhanced cooperation
regulations 1257 and 1260/2012/EU (they cover SOME limited substantive
rules) and an international agreement (which establishes an international court
and SOME other limited substantive rules). These texts are themselves closely
connected to the other international regime of the European patent established
by the Munich Convention. The lists of the Member States participating in these
different specific legal regimes are not identical. The rules governing patenta-
bility remain defined in another international agreement, also concluded with
third states. The effects of patentability are defined jointly by the two regula-
tions (which are not applicable in Italy or Spain), the other international agree-
ment, and the national rules. The European Patent Office, an international
authority, will deliver European patents with partial unitary consequences and
European patents with multiple national consequences.
This regime is quite different in its essentials from the EU regulations covering
trademarks, designs or plant variety protection. In a nutshell, these regulations
cover a broad range of topics, from the requirements to the scope of protection,
the limitations and exceptions, to basic rules about property and infringement.
Basically, according to Article 142 of the European Patent Convention, “any
group of Contracting States, which has provided by a special agreement that a
European patent granted for those States has a unitary character throughout
their territories, may provide that a European patent may only be granted jointly
in respect of all those States.” Regulation 1257/2012/EU is meant to be that
special agreement, as indicated by its Article 1(236).
Chapter II of the regulation describes the “effects of a European Patent with
unitary effect”. One effect is deemed to be “uniform protection” (title of Article
5). The scope of the right to prevent infringements and of the applicable limita-
tions “shall be uniform” (Art. 5 § 2). However, the text immediately makes a
reference to national legal systems. “The acts against which the patent provides
protection referred to in paragraph 1 and the applicable limitations shall be
those defined by the law applied to European patents with unitary effect in the
participating Member State whose national law is applicable to the European
36. Some have argued that such a regulation could not be considered as the agreement required by Article
142 EPC. Others consider that the EU has to adhere formally to the EPC system. This topic will not be
covered here.
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patent with unitary effect as an object of property” (Art. 5 § 3). Another effect
is “unitary effect as an object of property”. As we have seen, the two topics are
linked. The same reference mechanism appears. “A European patent with
unitary effect as an object of property shall be treated in its entirety and in all
the participating Member States as a national patent of the participating
Member State in which that patent has unitary effect” and where the applicant
has his residence, principal place of business, or a place of business (Art. 7 § 1).
It follows that a uniform patent is one whose partial effects are “uniform” by
the reference to a single national rule, not harmonized. The result is thus incom-
plete and very complex. Taking the example of Article 10, one analyst
concludes: “Article 10 creates uniformity of the applicable law throughout the
territory of enhanced cooperation. However, that uniformity comes at the price
of 25 different national laws determining the requirements of form for assign-
ments and licenses and their effects on existing licenses, as well as the admissi-
bility of restricted licenses, and the legal quality of such restrictions.”37
Additionally, many aspects are not “uniform” according to the two Regulations.
They remain in the realm of national law. As confirmed by recital 9 of Regula-
tion 1257/2012/EU, “the provisions of the EPC, the Agreement on a Unified
Patent Court, including its provisions defining the scope of that right and its
limitations, and national law, including rules of private international law, should
apply”.
There is however a limited harmonization of some of these effects in the UPCA.
The right to prevent the direct use of the invention is for example defined in
Article 25 of the Agreement. The right to prevent indirect use is defined in
Article 26. Some limitations of the effects of a patent are enumerated in Article
27 and are a consequence of the right based on prior use of the invention of the
invention in Article 28.
One thus needs to make a global interpretation of some provisions of Regula-
tion 1257/2012/EU, making references to various national laws, in accordance
with other provisions of the UPCA (bearing in mind that those texts apply to
different participating states), with other parts of national laws dealing with
effects uncovered by either the Regulation or the Agreement, and finally without
forgetting the need to integrate also the general provisions of the EU treaties
(beginning with competition and the four freedoms of circulation), and also
other EU regulations, like Regulation 1215/2012/EU. This will most certainly
not be a mental discipline for the faint-hearted.
37. H. Ullrich, Harmonizing patent law: the untamable Union patent, Max Planck Institute Research
Paper 12-03, 2012, p. 36.
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Furthermore the harmonization achieved remains quite limited. For example,
“as regards the unitary patent as an object of property, the UP Regulation
[meaning Regulation 1257/2012] contains only a very truncated set of rules.
Basic rules, as contained in all previous proposals (transfer of right, rights in
rem, treatment in execution and insolvency, erga omnes effect of restrictive
contractual licensing, date of third-party effects of patent transactions), are
missing. Instead, Article 10 of the UP Regulation provides for the exclusive
application of national law.”38 “The UP Regulation no longer contains rules on
prior user rights and on compulsory licenses for enabling the use of dependent
improvement inventions or in the public interest. This perpetuates and
entrenches anti-innovative effects in patent protection. Prior user rights are not
available at all. Compulsory licenses are assumed to be available under national
law only, if at all”39.
Additionally, there are potential incoherencies in the system. A specific problem,
for example, concerns compulsory licenses. According to Recital 10 of regula-
tion 1257/2012/EU, “compulsory licences for European patents with unitary
effect should be governed by the laws of the participating Member States as
regards their respective territories”. This raises a question concerning the
capacity of the participating Member States to impose such a mechanism in a
framework of partial harmonization, as established by the combination of
Regulation 1257/12 and the UPCA. Furthermore, contradictory national deci-
sions in this field could paradoxically endanger the unified effect of the
concerned patent40.
Finally, such a partial harmonization, in scope and in depth, risks generating
imbalances in this domain. “If, for example, the enforcement of patents is made
significantly more effective by virtue of the substantive right and flanking court,
whereas the rights of third parties are not safeguarded to the same extent
because they are not harmonized, the enforcement system will be one-sided”41.
38. R. Hilty, T. Jaeger, M. Lamping and H. Ullrich, The unitary patent package: twelve reasons for con-
cern, Max Planck Institute, 2012. (an excellent synthesis in a crowded field). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2169254&download=yes (accessed 13 August 2013).
39. Ibid. p. 3.
40. On the risk of fragmentation, see the comments mentioned in notes 33, 34 and 37, and also M. Tron-
coso, European Union patents: a mission impossible? An assessment of the historical and current
approaches, 17 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 261-262.
41. T. Jaeger, All back to square one? – an assessment of the latest proposals for a patent and
Court for the internal market and possible alternatives, Max Planck Institute, 2011, p. 8. (the author
mentions the specific case of compulsory licenses as an illustration).
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4.2. Language regime
This topic was at the origin of the use of the enhanced cooperation regime.
Furthermore, it has always been highly sensitive in the institutional debates.
Needless to say, the languages remain after 60 years in the treaties one privileged
area of the unanimity rule, and regulation n° 1 of 1958 remains some kind of
religious icon.
Three elements are important.
Firstly, the rules are largely influenced by those of the European Patent Office
(EPO). This results clearly from Article 3 § 1 of Regulation 1260/2012/EU. As
a principle, “where the specification of a European patent, which benefits from
unitary effect has been published in accordance with Article 14(6) of the EPC,
no further translations shall be required”42. “Since the EPO is responsible for
the grant of European patents, the translation arrangements for the European
patent with unitary effect should be built on the current procedure in the EPO.
Those arrangements should aim to achieve the necessary balance between the
interests of economic operators and the public interest, in terms of the cost of
proceedings and the availability of technical information.”43
In that framework, the London agreement of 17 October 2000, which entered
into force in 2008, tends to facilitate the translation requirements, using the
option offered by Article 65 of the EPC44. The agreement was signed by 10
Member States in 2000 and 2001, and ratified later by 8 others45.
Secondly, very high hopes are entertained concerning the spread of automatic
translation. “Machine translations of patent applications and specifications into
all official languages of the Union should be available as soon as possible.
Machine translations are being developed by the EPO and are a very important
tool in seeking to improve access to patent information and to widely dissemi-
nate technological knowledge. The timely availability of high quality machine
translations of European patent applications and specifications into all official
languages of the Union would benefit all users of the European patent system.
Machine translations are a key feature of European Union policy.” (Recital 11).
However, simultaneously, different provisions of Regulation 1260/2012/EU
emphasize that “machine translations should serve for information purposes
only and should not have any legal effect.”
42. As we’ll see later, one of the exceptions concerns the hypothesis of a judicial litigation.
43. Recital 6, Regulation 1260/2012/EU.
44. OJ EPO 2001, 549.
45. http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/london-agreement/status.html (accessed 20 August
2013).
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Thirdly, while waiting for ideal machine translations, one had to define a tran-
sitional regime. As Recital 12 explains, “before a system of high quality machine
translations into all official languages of the Union becomes available, a request
for unitary effect as referred to in Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012
should be accompanied by a full translation of the specification of the patent
into English where the language of the proceedings before the EPO is French or
German, or into any official language of the Member States that is an official
language of the Union where the language of the proceedings before the EPO is
English. Those arrangements would ensure that during a transitional period all
European patents with unitary effect are made available in English which is the
language customarily used in the field of international technological research
and publications. Furthermore, such arrangements would ensure that with
respect to European patents with unitary effect, translations would be published
in other official languages of the participating Member States.”
4.3. Costs
Costs are essential for the companies concerned. Translation is naturally one
aspect of this concern. From this point of view, the benefits of the reform appear,
at least in the short term, to be limited. There are however other aspects.
Another aspect is the question of the fees required for the registration and the
renewal of patents. The future system is well described in the Recitals of Regu-
lation 1257/2012. The Member States should invest the EPO with the power to
define the unitary patent fees46. There should be a single annual fee for the
renewal of a European unitary patent47. Half of the proceeds from these fees
46. “The participating Member States should give certain administrative tasks relating to European pat-
ents with unitary effect to the EPO, in particular as regards the administration of requests for unitary
effect, the registration of unitary effect and of any limitation, licence, transfer, revocation or lapse of
European patents with unitary effect, the collection and distribution of renewal fees, the publication of
translations for information purposes during a transitional period and the administration of a compensa-
tion scheme for the reimbursement of translation costs incurred by applicants filing European patent
applications in a language other than one of the official languages of the EPO” (Recital 17).
47. “Patent proprietors should pay a single annual renewal fee for a European patent with unitary effect.
Renewal fees should be progressive throughout the term of the patent protection and, together with the
fees to be paid to the European Patent Organisation during the pre-grant stage, should cover all costs
associated with the grant of the European patent and the administration of the unitary patent protection.
The level of the renewal fees should be set with the aim of facilitating innovation and fostering the com-
petitiveness of European businesses, taking into account the situation of specific entities such as small and
medium-sized enterprises, for example in the form of lower fees. It should also reflect the size of the mar-
ket covered by the patent and be similar to the level of the national renewal fees for an average European
patent taking effect in the participating Member States at the time when the level of the renewal fees is
first set” (Recital 19).
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should be redistributed to the participating Member States according to rather
complex parameters48.
The question of fees is a complex one, since it is dealt with at both the EPO level
and the Member States level (especially the renewal fees). Furthermore, the fees
proceeds collected at the EPO level are also shared between the EPO and the
Member States49. Much of the attractiveness of the new patent regime will
depend on the actual level of the fees, and any evaluation of this remains quite
uncertain. The Commission indicates for example that the future regime could
bring a reduction, but not during the transitional period. Even after that, the
differences with the United States, for example, would remain quite substan-
tial50. In the present situation, many inventors tend to have their patent estab-
lished in a few Member States, beginning with the big ones, and especially with
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. A balance will have to be found
between the added value of a new system and its added costs. Meanwhile,
wisdom seems to dictate prudence before committing to the new system, since
the present texts do not yet guarantee that the added protection in many small
States will not result in a large increase in fees. This seems confirmed by the
statement of 14 December 2012 in the Council: “when deciding on the share of
distribution of the renewal fees, the representatives of the participating Member
States will be guided by the criteria listed in Article 13(2) of the Regulation
implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent
protection, with the aim of allowing all participating Member States to keep
48. “Renewal fees should be paid to the European Patent Organisation. The EPO should retain an
amount to cover the expenses generated at the EPO in carrying out tasks in relation to the unitary patent
protection in accordance with Article 146 of the EPC. The remaining amount should be distributed
among the participating Member States and should be used for patent-related purposes. The share of dis-
tribution should be set on the basis of fair, equitable and relevant criteria, namely the level of patent activ-
ity and the size of the market, and should guarantee a minimum amount to be distributed to each
participating Member State in order to maintain a balanced and sustainable functioning of the system.
The distribution should provide compensation for having an official language other than one of the offi-
cial languages of the EPO, having a disproportionately low level of patenting activity established on the
basis of the European Innovation Scoreboard, and/or having acquired membership of the European Pat-
ent Organisation relatively recently.” (Recital 21)
49. For interesting comments about the nature of these fees, see H. Ulrich, Patent protection in Europe:
integrating Europe into the community or the Community into Europe, 8 European Law Journal 433-491
(2002), pp. 440-44.
50. “After the transitional period (in which certain additional translations will be required), the cost to
obtain a European Patent with unitary effect will be around 5 000 euro. This covers the procedural fees of
the EPO as well as the cost of the translation of the claims to the two other procedural languages of the
EPO. During the transitional period of maximum 12 years, the cost will be slightly higher, about 6 500
euro. This includes the cost of the additional translation required during the transitional period: in order
to facilitate the access to patent information until high-quality machine translations become available,
European patents with unitary effect that were granted in French or German will need to be translated to
English and the ones granted in English will need to be translated to another official language of the EU.
Obtaining patent protection in the territory of the 27 Member States by means of a European patent costs
today about 36 000 euro (the majority of which goes on translation and other costs linked to validation,
such as fees of local patent offices and costs for local patent agents). By comparison, in the US, a patent
costs about 2 000 euros, in China about 600 euros.”
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/patent/faqs/index_fr.htm#maincontentSec11
(accessed 20 August 2013).
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their current renewal fee income while at the same time ensuring that those
Member States which currently have a low renewal fee income will significantly
increase this income”51. The constraints are such that it will be difficult to
prevent a rise in costs, at least in the transitional period, compared to the wide
present practice of validating only in a few States52.
Yet another aspect is the question of the costs of legal proceedings. After a tran-
sitional period, “the budget of the Court shall be financed by the Court’s own
financial revenues”. This concept of a self-supporting international court seems
quite original, as we shall see later (see § 6.6).
A very tentative evaluation of the benefits of such an approach was carried out
in 2009. According to the Harhoff report prepared for the Commission,
“avoiding duplication of infringement or revocation cases is likely to generate
large benefits for the European economy. The results obtained here suggest that
currently, between 146 and 311 infringement cases are being duplicated in the
Member States. By 2013, this number is likely to increase to between 202 and
431 cases. Total private savings in 2013 would span the interval between EUR
148 and 289 million. Comparing the benefits to operating cost of EUR 27.5
million shows that the benefit-cost ratio ranges between 5.4 and 10.5 in 2013.
Hence, the cost-benefit assessment focusing on avoided duplication leads to a
highly positive evaluation of the proposal. Various checks confirm the robust-
ness of this result in the presence of additional infringement or revocation liti-
gation. The results also show that the level of litigation costs at the new unified
Patent Court will play a crucial role for access and for the monetary benefits
from avoided duplication. Given that litigation before the unified Patent Court
should be feasible at the low-cost levels currently present in the continental
patent litigation systems, the financing of the Patent Court should not be purely
private. The fact that litigation, in particular revocation, yields external effects
is a clear argument in favor of supporting the Court’s budget with public
funds”53.
51. Council document, n° 17503/12 ADD 1 REV 1, p. 2.
52. One will find a tentative comparison between the present situation and the future one in Reddie and
Grose, How much will the unitary patent cost?, 2013.
53. D. Harhoff, Economic Cost-Benefit Analysis of a Unified and Integrated European Litigation System,
2009, p. 53.
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/studies/litigation_system_en.pdf (accessed 17
July 2013)
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§ 5. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INSTITUTIONAL
SYSTEM
The institutional implications of the chosen strategy must not be underestimated
either.
Opinion 1/09 has provoked the abandonment of an international court with the
triple participation of the EU, the Member States, and a number of third States,
in favour of an international court limited to the Member States. This is a deci-
sion of a systemic character, with multiple collateral consequences, which may
only be evaluated in the light of the objectives being pursued. As the Commis-
sion underlined in 2007, the Member States have very different and even
conflicting objectives54. Some of them entertained an EU vision, others an inter-
national vision, of the settlement of conflicts, centred on the European patent of
the Munich Convention. Still others, on the contrary, were privileging a global
vision, encompassing both European and EU patents.
Since the chosen system is limited only to the Member States, the use of an
international court rather than an EU court, based on Article 257 TFEU, takes
of course a very different significance. In a negotiation setting limited to the
Member States, the use of an EU court might appear much more logical55. The
fact that it has been refused has nothing to do with Opinion 1/09, and every-
thing to do with the strong preferences of different actors. Patents thus become
a most peculiar area of EU law and especially of the EU courts system.
Firstly, the implementation of EU law is now divided into two areas. In the first
one, judicial review is provided by the system of the EU courts. In the second
one, it is provided in general by a specific system of courts created by an inter-
national treaty. This constitutes a fundamental precedent. The UPCA has
created a system of courts. “The Court of First Instance shall comprise a central
division as well as local and regional divisions” (Art. 5 § 1). “The central divi-
sion shall have its seat in Paris, with sections in London and Munich.” (Art. 5
§ 2). “A local division shall be set up in a Contracting Member State upon its
request in accordance with the Statute” (Art. 5 § 3). “An additional local divi-
sion shall be set up in a Contracting Member State upon its request for every one
hundred patent cases per calendar year that have been commenced in that
Contracting Member State during three successive years prior to or subsequent
to the date of entry into force of this Agreement” (Art. 5 § 4). Such a creation
may be discontinued later (Art. 18 § 3). Incidentally, the possibility to decen-
54. See COM (2007) 165.
55. On this, see the subtle approach of F. de Visscher, European Unified Patent Court: another more real-
istic and more equitable approach should be examined, GRUR Int 2012, pp. 214.
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tralize judicial review of EU law had been debated for decades; the UPCA finally
does it and even in various ways56.
Secondly, the unified patent court relies on enhanced cooperation of an
extremely particular kind. It is linked to the creation of a specialized court, and
additionally this creation is made by an international treaty. This also consti-
tutes an important precedent. Until now, the enhanced cooperation mechanism
had been used to circumvent the opposition of one or two Member States to a
specific measure. Here, the scope of the operation is substantially wider, since
an international agency is authorized to implement EU law and an international
court is created to control this implementation. Additionally, these enhanced
cooperation measures have been contested by two Member States before the
Court of Justice. Their arguments were rejected in the judgment of the Court of
Justice of 16 April 201357.
Thirdly, these enhanced cooperation regulations have provoked questions about
their compatibility with the Treaties. Some of these questions have been covered
in the judgment of the Court of Justice of 16 April 2013. Others have been
raised by some Spanish government’s new annulment actions in 201358. Others
have been mentioned by observers59. This paper will not deal with these ques-
tions, since some of them have been submitted to the Court, and this would
require a very extensive analysis.
From the legal point of view, it must be noted in any case that the EPO becomes
an organ in charge of the implementation of EU rules. Such a mechanism raises
interesting questions. How can companies challenge an implementation deci-
sion of the EPO in that framework? And how can the EPO’s interpretation of
EU law be reviewed by the Court of Justice? Let’s imagine for example that a
company intends to challenge the conformity of the decision establishing the
fees to the parameters defined by Regulation 1257/2012. Interestingly, the EPO
gives the following description of its boards of appeal system: “the boards of
appeal, though integrated in the organisational structure of the EPO, are inde-
pendent from the Office in their decisions and are bound only by the European
Patent Convention”60.
56. On this complex topic, see as in introduction J.P. Jacque and J. Weiler, On the road to European
Union – A new judicial architecture, Common Market Law Review, 1990, pp. 185-207.
57. See the Court of justice’s judgment of 16 April 2013 in Joined Cases C-274/11 and 295/11.
58. See Cases C-146/13 and C-174/13.
59. See M. Lamping, Enhanced Cooperation – A Proper Approach to Market Integration in the Field of
Unitary Patent Protection?, International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 2011,
N° 8, p. 879-925 et A.-S. Lamblin-Gourdin, Les coopérations renforcées au secours du brevet européen,
Revue de l’Union européenne, Avril 2012, n° 557, p. 254-269.
60. http://www.epo.org/about-us/boards-of-appeal.html (accessed 20 August 2013).
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Fourthly, the international treaty establishing the specialized court also contains
substantive rules. The cohabitation of these rules with the principles of the Euro-
pean Union Treaties and the relevant EU regulations will have to be defined.
For example, we have seen that the UPCA establishes specific rules about the use
of languages. In some cases, this could oblige the parties to plead in a language
they have not chosen. Interestingly, the Advocates General of the Court of
Justice have underlined that such a regime could be seen as incompatible with
the rights of defence61. If one follows this line of reasoning, the rule could thus
be challenged in the future.
Fifthly, the use of an international convention could complicate any future revi-
sion. Generally, any important amendment will require the unanimity of the
participating States. Simplified revisions are nonetheless possible. According to
Article 87 § 2 UPCA, “the Administrative Committee may amend this Agree-
ment to bring it into line with an international treaty relating to patents or
Union law”. This option however only applies in limited hypotheses. Even in
this simplest case, the process can be blocked by a participating member62.
Furthermore, modifications to certain substantial provisions governing the legal
effects of patents could become extremely complex, since they could concern
both the UPCA and Regulation 1257/2012/EU.
Sixthly, this negotiation has provoked recurrent interventions of the European
Council. The first one concerned Articles 6 to 8 of the proposal for an enhanced
cooperation regulation submitted by the Commission. These provisions sought
to reproduce (and render more precise) the existing mechanisms in the fields of
trademarks, drawings and designs. They were contested for reasons both consti-
tutional and technical63. In its June 2012 conclusions, the European Council
indicated: “we suggest that Articles 6 to 8 of the Regulation implementing
enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection to
be adopted by the Council and the European Parliament be deleted” 64. Most
fortunately for the coherence of the unified patent, this abandonment provoked
the opposition of the European Parliament. In the end, these provisions were
transferred from the Regulation to the international agreement. This explains
the final hybrid nature of the legal regime.
61. Position of 2 July 2010, § 121.
http://europeanpatentcaselaw.blogspot.com/2010/08/juridiction-commune-et-brevet.html
62. “A decision of the Administrative Committee taken on the basis of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not take
effect if a Contracting Member State declares within twelve months of the date of the decision, on the
basis of its relevant internal decision-making procedures, that it does not wish to be bound by the deci-
sion. In this case, a Review Conference of the Contracting Member States shall be convened” (Art. 87 § 3
UPCA).
63. See the very useful report of the UK House of Commons: The unified Patent Court: help or hin-
drance?, vols. I and II, 2012. (accessed 13 March 2013).
64. § 3.
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This transfer did not fulfil the objective pursued by some actors in the process,
which was the elimination of any intervention of the Court of Justice. “As a
court common to the Contracting Member States and as part of their judicial
system, the Court shall cooperate with the Court of Justice of the European
Union to ensure the correct application and uniform interpretation of Union
law, as any national court” (Art. 21 UPCA). Its judgments are based on “Union
law” and “this agreement” (Art. 24 UPCA). In that context, “the Court shall
apply Union law in its entirety and shall respect its primacy”. (Art. 20 UPCA).
Thus, the contested role of the Court of Justice has been maintained, but slightly
less openly. The system of “unitary” effect however has meanwhile become
much more complex.
The second intervention of the European Council also contributed to the
complexity of the regime, but from a different point of view. It concerns
different aspects related to the seats of the organs of the UPC. The “Heads of
State or Government of the participating Member States agreed on the solution
for the last outstanding issue of the patents package, namely the seat of the
Central Division of the Court of First Instance of the Unified Patent Court
(UPC). That seat, along with the office of the President of the Court of First
Instance, will be located in Paris. (…) Given the highly specialised nature of
patent litigation and the need to maintain high quality standards, thematic clus-
ters will be created in two sections of the Central Division, one in London
(chemistry, including pharmaceuticals, classification C, human necessities, clas-
sification A), the other in Munich (mechanical engineering, classification F)”65.
If one adds to that the localization of the Court of appeal in Luxembourg, of the
patent mediation and arbitration centre cumulatively in Ljubljana and Lisbon
(Art. 35 UPCA), and of the Training Centre for judges in Budapest, the unified
court of patent appears as the most dis-unified international court, as far as its
management is concerned.
For those of us mature/old enough to have followed the tough 1993 negotiations
on the seat and working places of the Union institutions, this represents a clear
and substantial deterioration. One can only hope that, should the European
Council deal in the future with the creation of a “single” European energy regu-
lator, the coal department will not be localised in Warsaw, the petrol department
in Edinburg, the sun department in Malaga, the wind in Copenhagen, the gas
department in Bucarest, the nuclear department in Tampere, the biofuel depart-
ment in Salzburg, and the board of appeals in Riga.
The participating Member States have even agreed on the nationality of the first
president of the central division. “The first President of the Court of First
65. Ibid.
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Instance should come from the Member State hosting the central division.” This
is also an important precedent, as it indicates that the use of the intergovern-
mental method could allow the Member States more direct influence on the
functioning of the courts in the future.
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§ 6. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU COURTS
SYSTEM
Finally, the implications of the creation of this quite special specialized court for
the EU courts system have been underestimated. On one hand, the approach
chosen is generating a lot of complexity. On the other hand, the autonomy of
the two systems allows for very interesting comparisons and experiments. There
are many original concepts in the new system, which call for an in-depth
comparative study with the old one.
6.1. A European (but not EU) system of specialized 
courts completely tailor-made
The new Court will thus have jurisdiction for unitary patents but also for tradi-
tional European patents. Mainly it will deal with cases concerning validity and
infringement. After the signature of the UPCA, one could have imagined finding
some synergies between the existing administrative and procedural aspects of
the EU courts system and the new one. This is not what happened. This was
partly inevitable. The preference for an international agreement does not facili-
tate the use of many EU instruments and organs.The signatory States have
clearly decided to keep these two systems as separate as possible. The budget of
the UPC system will be completely separate from the EU budget. Its officials will
not be covered by the EU public staff regulations. Its rules of procedure will not
be coordinated in any way with those of the EU courts.
Revealingly, the signatory States have even decided that the negotiations aiming
at the implementation of the UPCA will not be carried out in the buildings of
the European Union, and they will barely tolerate the presence of a Commission
representative. A notice concerning the signature of the Agreement has been
published by the Council in the Official Journal of the Union66. This seems to
be the only exception to the total separation between the UPC and the EU courts
systems.
There are both opportunities and risks in this strategy. The opportunity is to
allow numerous experiments in the creation of a specialized court at the Euro-
pean (but not EU) level. This has been absolutely impossible until now due to
the adamant opposition of the Court of Justice to the creation of any new EU
specialized court (more about this later). From this point of view, many new
interesting elements in the new system deserve attention. The risk is however
that many already existing instruments will be redefined, the contacts and
66. OJ C 175/1.
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possibly the personnel movements between the two systems be limited, and thus
possibly the misunderstandings between them be increased.
6.2. A new appointment process for the judges
According to Article 15 UPCA, “the Court shall comprise both legally qualified
judges and technically qualified judges. Judges shall ensure the highest standards
of competence and shall have proven experience in the field of patent litigation”.
Two innovations appear already at that level. The first one is the distinction
between legally and technically qualified judges. The second one is the organi-
zation of a broad training framework by Article 19 UPC, “in order to improve
and increase available patent litigation expertise and to ensure a broad
geographic distribution of such specific knowledge and experience”67.
According to Article 16 UPC, “the Advisory Committee shall establish a list of
the most suitable candidates to be appointed as judges of the Court, in accord-
ance with the Statute. On the basis of that list, the Administrative Committee
shall appoint the judges of the Court acting by common accord.” This is
completed by Article 3 of the Statute. “Vacancies shall be publicly advertised
and shall indicate the relevant eligibility criteria (…). The Advisory Committee
shall give an opinion on candidates’ suitability to perform the duties of a judge
of the Court. (…) The list shall contain at least twice as many candidates as there
are vacancies”. Furthermore, “when appointing judges, the Administrative
Committee shall ensure the best legal and technical expertise and a balanced
composition of the Court on as broad a geographical basis as possible among
nationals of the Contracting Member States”. According to Article 4, “judges
shall be appointed for a term of six years, (…) and may be re-appointed”68.
From this point of view, the procedure is largely similar to the selection mecha-
nism for the Civil Service Tribunal. There are however two differences. Firstly,
“where necessary, the Advisory Committee may recommend that, prior to the
67. This will encompass: (a) internships in national patent courts or divisions of the Court of First
Instance hearing a substantial number of patent litigation cases; (b) improvement of linguistic skills; (c)
technical aspects of patent law; (d) the dissemination of knowledge and experience in civil procedure for
technically qualified judges; (e) the preparation of candidate-judges.
See also the precisions given by Article 11 of the Statute.
68. In September 2013 a call was made for expression of interest from candidate judges. According to this
document, “the pre-selection of candidate judges will be conducted by the Preparatory Committee. An
Advisory Panel composed of experienced, active or former members of appeal courts or supreme courts
or active or former lawyers with recognised competence in patent litigation is to be established (…). This
Advisory Panel will assist the Preparatory Committee and the Human resources and training working
group both on assessing the qualification and experience of candidates and on establishing the training
requirements for the candidate judges. This procedure is without prejudice to the formal appointment
procedure.”
http://www.unified-patent-court.org/images/documents/judges-expression-interest.pdf (accessed 8 Octo-
ber 2013).
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decision on the appointment, a candidate judge receive training in patent litiga-
tion”. This could provoke debates about the required level of qualification.
Secondly, the rules governing the appointment of the members of the committee
have not been defined with the same degree of precision.
Fundamentally, one essential question remains: will this court be saddled with
the same instability problem as the Civil Service Tribunal and the General
Court? In that context, after long negotiations, the Member States have indi-
cated in 2011 a desire to establish a rigid rotation of nationalities in the Civil
Service Tribunal at each renewal69. The same preoccupation explains in part the
repeated failure in 2002 and 2013 of the proposal of the Court of Justice to
increase the number of judges of the General Court70.
6.3. A new governance system for the courts
The management of the Court system relies on four different committees. Firstly,
there are the Administrative Committee, the Advisory Committee and the
Budget Committee (art. 11 UPC). The most important one is the Administrative
Committee, consisting of one representative of each Contracting Member State,
which normally adopts decisions of general scope by a majority of three quarters
of the Contracting Member States represented and voting (Art. 12 UPC)71.
The Administrative Committee adopts the Rules of Procedure on the basis of
broad consultations with stakeholders (Art. 41 UPC). It adopts the financial
regulations (art. 33 Statute). It sets the remuneration of the President of the
Court of Appeal, the President of the Court of First Instance, the judges, the
Registrar, the Deputy-Registrar and the staff (Art. 12 statute).The budget shall
be adopted by the Budget Committee (Art. 26 Statute).
Secondly, there is a presidium formed by “the President of the Court of Appeal,
who shall act as chairperson, the President of the Court of First Instance, two
judges of the Court of Appeal elected from among their number, three judges of
the Court of First Instance who are full-time judges of the Court elected from
among their number, and the Registrar as a non-voting member” (art. 15 § 1 of
the Statute). The Presidium draws up propositions for the amendment of the
Rules of Procedure and the annual budget, manages the training programme for
69. Three judges were thus constrained to leave, including the president, though two had expressed their
desire to remain. In 2013, the replacement of the retiring Polish judge provoked a lot of discussions
between the Member States.
70. For more comments about the functional consequences, see F. Dehousse, The reform of the EU courts
– The need of a management approach, TEPSA/Egmont Paper n° 53, 2011, § 3.1.1.
71. As we have seen, according to Article 16 UPCA, on the basis of the list established by the advisory
committee, “the Administrative Committee shall appoint the judges of the Court acting by common
accord.” This is thus, for example, one decision which is not taken by “the majority of three quarters of
the Contracting Member States”.
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judges, takes decisions on the appointment and removal of the Registrar. It may
also waive the immunity of judges (Art. 8 Statute). Its decisions require the pres-
ence or representation of all members, and are taken by a majority of the votes
(art. 15 § 5 Statute).
In this domain, the governance system appears substantially more transparent
and clearer than the existing system in the Court of Justice of the European
Union (the institution). The CJEU is in fact managed largely by the general
meeting of the Court of Justice (the judicial organ) and its registrar72. An admin-
istrative committee exists, but its role remains vague in the official texts.
Most interestingly, there is no clear description of the governance system of the
Court of Justice of the European Union (the institution) in its statute. Recently,
the extreme sensitivity of the topic was once again confirmed during the revision
of the Rules of procedure of the Court of Justice (the judicial organ)73. The
Court proposed to introduce into its rules of procedure a provision on the
management of the services of the institution, though it is a purely administra-
tive and not procedural matter, additionally already covered in the statute. This
was approved by the Council in the new Article 9 § 3 of the Rules of procedure.
However, the meaning of the text is clearly different from one linguistic version
to the other. The English version, which was the basis of the negotiations inside
the Council, indicates: “the President shall ensure the proper functioning of the
services of the Court”. The other language versions indicate that the President
shall ensure the proper functioning of the services of the “institution”74. The
same divergence is reproduced in the new Article 20 § 4 of the same rules,
concerning the powers of the registrar of the Court of Justice. This appears more
than a nuance, as it touches on such a fundamental question as the management
of the whole institution75.
72. The will to maintain this situation was already one source of the resistance of the Court during the
Nice Treaty negotiation of 2000, repeated in the Convention on the future of Europe, to be called “the
Constitutional Court” or “the Supreme Court”. This maintained the confusion surrounding the whole
question and the Court has thus become officially “the Court of justice of the Court of justice of the Euro-
pean Union”, the General Court “the General Court of the Court of justice of the European Union”, and
the CST “the Civil Service Tribunal of the Court of justice of the European Union”. Such a level of clarity
is far from optimal.
73. OJ 2012, L 265/1.
74. “Le président veille au bon fonctionnement des services de l’institution” (French version). “Der Präsi-
dent sorgt für einen ordnungsgemäßen Arbeitsgang der Dienststellen des Organs” (German version). “El
Presidente velará por el buen funcionamiento de los servicios de la institución” (Spanish version). “Il pres-
idente vigila sul corretto funzionamento dei servizi dell’istituzione” (Italian version).
75. According to the new Article 20 § 4 of the Rules of procedure in the English version, which was also
the basis of the negotiation in the Council, “the registrar shall direct the services of the Court under the
authority of the president of the Court”. In the other languages versions, he directs the services of the
whole institution.
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6.4. A new language regime
Regulation 1260/2012 imposes a general translation obligation on patent
proprietors. More specifically, according to Article 4 § 2, they have to “provide
in the course of legal proceedings, at the request of a court competent in the
participating Member States for disputes concerning European patents with
unitary effect, a full translation of the patent into the language used in the
proceedings of that court”.
The general rules regarding the use of languages during the judicial proceedings
are defined by Articles 49 and 50 UPC. They reflect a clear preference for the
language in which the patent was granted. The UPC Court of first instance and
Court of appeal enjoy a limited flexibility, provided they obtain the agreement
of the parties.
However, other than these, there are some quite innovative provisions.
Firstly, according to Article 51 UPC, “any panel of the Court of First Instance
and the Court of Appeal may, to the extent deemed appropriate, dispense with
translation requirements”. This possibility does not exist in the EU courts.
Furthermore, in the context of an infringement action, the right to a translation
is conditional. “A defendant having its residence, principal place of business or
place of business in a Member State shall have the right to obtain, upon request,
translations of relevant documents in the language of the Member State of resi-
dence, principal place of business or, in the absence of residence or principal
place of business, place of business, in the following circumstances: (a) jurisdic-
tion is entrusted to the central division in accordance with Article 33(1) third or
fourth subparagraph, and (b) the language of proceedings at the central division
is a language which is not an official language of the Member State where the
defendant has its residence, principal place of business or, in the absence of resi-
dence or principal place of business, place of business, and (c) the defendant
does not have proper knowledge of the language of the proceedings.”
6.5. New procedural rules
Article 42 UPC begins with an interesting general statement. “The Court shall
ensure that the rules, procedures and remedies provided for in this Agreement
and in the Statute are used in a fair and equitable manner and do not distort
competition”. The focus on competition is certainly significant in a text dedi-
cated to the correct protection of exclusive rights.
First, the draft rules of procedure do not foresee any precise rule governing the
attribution of cases to panels and to judges-rapporteurs. According to rules 17.2
and 18, this could become a discretionary power of the president of the Court
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of first instance and of the presiding judge of the panel. It remains to be seen
whether this will not provoke problems regarding languages, national interests,
and the principle of the “juge légal”.
The draft Rules of procedure foresee different possibilities to limit the scope of
hearings. According to Rule 113 § 2, “oral testimony at the oral hearing or at
any separate hearing shall be limited to issues identified by the judge-rapporteur
or the presiding judge as having to be decided on the basis of oral evidence”.
According to Rule 113 § 3, “the presiding judge may, after consulting the panel,
limit a party’s oral submissions if the panel is sufficiently informed”.
Rule 220 § 2 indicates that “procedural decisions or orders may be appealed
with leave of the Court” (it remains to be seen whether this possibility will really
simplify the proceedings). Rule 243 provides that referrals back to the Court of
first instance will be limited to “exceptional circumstances” (contrary to Rule
220 § 2, this is certainly a factor of judicial efficiency).
Case management has been covered extensively in the draft Rules of procedure.
Rule 332 of the draft Rules of procedure defines what “active case manage-
ment” is76. Rule 334 defines the case management powers of the judge-rappor-
teur, the presiding judge or the panel77. According to Rule 333, a review of case
76. “Rule 332 – General principles of case management
Active case management includes
(a) encouraging the parties to co-operate with each other during the proceedings;
(b) identifying the issues at an early stage;
(c) deciding promptly which issues need full investigation and disposing summarily of other issues;
(d) deciding the order in which issues are to be resolved;
(e) encouraging the parties to make use of the Centre and facilitating the use of the Centre;
(f) helping the parties to settle the whole or part of the action;
(g) fixing timetables or otherwise controlling the progress of the action;
(h) considering whether the likely benefits of taking a particular step justify the cost of taking it;
(i) dealing with as many aspects of the action as the Court can on the same occasion;
(j) dealing with the action without the parties needing to attend in person;
(k) making use of available technical means; and
(l) giving directions to ensure that the hearing of the action proceeds quickly and efficiently.”
77. “Rule 334 – Case management powers
Except where the Agreement, the Statute or these Rules provide otherwise, the judge-rapporteur, the pre-
siding judge or the panel may
(a) extend or shorten the period for compliance with any rule, practice direction or order;
(b) adjourn or bring forward the interim conference or the oral hearing;
(c) communicate with the parties to instruct them about wishes or requirements of the Court;
(d) direct a separate hearing of any issue;
(e) decide the order in which issues are to be decided;
(f) exclude an issue from consideration;
(g) dismiss or decide on a claim after a decision on a preliminary issue makes a decision on further issues
irrelevant to the outcome of the action;
(h) dismiss a pleading summarily if it has no prospect of succeeding;
(i) consolidate any matter or issue or order them to be heard together;
(j) make any order pursuant to Rules 103 to 109.”
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management orders would be possible78.
Most fundamentally, according to Rule 262, “written evidence, decisions and
orders lodged at the Court and recorded by the Registry shall be available to the
public for on-line consultation, unless a party requests that certain information
be kept confidential and the Court makes such an order”. If approved this could
constitute a fundamental change in the direction of a much greater transparency
of judicial proceedings.
The agreement also opens the possibility, “in exceptional circumstances” of a
separate dissenting opinion by a judge (Art. 78 § 2 UPCA). This is an important
precedent at the EU level. It does not seem certain that all the implications of
this provision have been examined. Finally, the agreement also opens the possi-
bility of “patent mediation and arbitration” (Art. 35 UPCA), another innova-
tion.
6.6. A new approach to costs
The UPCA and its implementation texts reflect a particular preoccupation with
judicial costs. In itself, this is already an innovation. According to Article 40 § 3
UPCA, “the Statute shall guarantee that the functioning of the Court is organ-
ised in the most efficient and cost-effective manner and shall ensure equitable
access to justice”.
In a more detailed way, Rule 332 of the draft Rules of procedure provides that
case management includes “considering whether the likely benefits of taking a
particular step justify the cost of taking it”. This raises a wholly new question:
are we going to see in the future some costs assessments of procedural decisions?
And what will be the weight of such a consideration?
Another important innovation is established by Article 36 UPCA. In principle,
after a transitional period, “the budget of the Court shall be financed by the
Court’s own financial revenues”. In that line of reasoning, according to Article
70 §§ 1 and 2, “parties to proceedings before the Court shall pay court fees”
and “court fees shall be paid in advance, unless the Rules of Procedure provide
otherwise. Any party which has not paid a prescribed court fee may be excluded
78. “1. Case management decisions or orders made by the judge-rapporteur or the presiding judge shall
be reviewed by the panel, on a reasoned Application by a party. 2. An application for the review of a case
management order shall be lodged within two weeks of service of the order. The application shall set out
the grounds for review and the evidence, if any, in support of the grounds. The other party shall be given
an opportunity to be heard. 3. The party seeking a review shall pay the fee for the review of a case man-
agement order”.
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from further participation in the proceedings”. As a result, the parties will in
effect also finance the training programme of the UPC79.
More generally, this is the first time that the European institutions initiate a real
reflection regarding the costs of justice. In 2009, a first study was produced
about the costs and benefits of an integrated European patent litigation
system80. In 2011, a second one was produced concerning the caseload and the
financing of the unified patent court81. Though of course these reflections are of
a highly prospective nature, they represent a considerable progress.
6.7. A parallel court for a seven year transitional 
period
One flexible aspect of this new judicial system resides in the transitional regime
established by Article 83 UPCA. “During a transitional period of seven years
after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, an action for infringement
or for revocation of a European patent or an action for infringement or for
declaration of invalidity of a supplementary protection certificate issued for a
product protected by a European patent may still be brought before national
courts or other competent national authorities.” (Art. 83 § 1). In fact, compa-
nies thus have a choice.
According to Article 83 § 5, “five years after the entry into force of this Agree-
ment, the Administrative Committee shall carry out a broad consultation with
the users of the patent system and a survey on the number of European patents
and supplementary protection certificates issued for products protected by
European patents with respect to which actions for infringement or for revoca-
tion or declaration of invalidity are still brought before the national courts
pursuant to paragraph 1, the reasons for this and the implications thereof. On
the basis of this consultation and an Opinion of the Court, the Administrative
Committee may decide to prolong the transitional period by up to seven years.”
Many companies will probably prefer to wait until they have some first indica-
tion of the productivity and costs of the new judicial organs before committing
themselves. The very important uncertainties surrounding these matters will
most likely be a strong incentive in that direction.
79. Consequently, if the future Court is self-financing, it means that the applicants will also have to
finance the training costs of prospective judges. Without determining whether such a mechanism is pro-
portional or not, one can certainly conclude that this is another innovation.
80. D. Harhoff, Economic cost-benefit analysis of a unified and integrated European patent litigation sys-
tem, 26 February 2009.
81. DG Internal market and services, Study on the caseload and financing of the Unified patent court, 7
November 2011.
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CONCLUSIONS
What does all this tell us about the present state of the European Union? Firstly,
the new EU of 28 Member States and nearly 500 million people has become
extraordinarily difficult to manage. This is especially the case when, as here,
unanimity applies. Except in an acute crisis, the will to compromise is weak.
Secondly, this is all the more the case when the language question is at issue. An
extensive and varied case-law illustrates this extreme sensitiveness. Thirdly, this
episode offers a new illustration of the Member States’ tendency to use the clas-
sical instruments of international law to compensate for the present extreme
rigidity of EU instruments. Fourthly, the single market remains quite incomplete
in the area of intellectual property. Patents provide a striking illustration, and so
do copyrights.
After a long detour, we can now come back to the essential question: why has it
been deemed necessary to maintain an international court, and not an EU one,
when it had been decided to limit its members to those of the European Union?
Different reasons played a role, as usual. However, it remains difficult to under-
stand this outcome without reading the positions taken by some professionals
and operators in the field of patents, and also by the Court of Justice.
On one side, as G. Triet and M. Vivant note, some circles do not wish at all any
review by the Court of Justice at all, fearing that the Court is not really prepared
for the particularities of patent litigation, or sufficiently understanding of the
interests of companies (author’s translation)82. To give a few illustrations, the
resolution of EPLAW (European Patent Lawyers Association) of 29 October
2011 declares: “The rejection of Articles 6-8 by the great majority of member
states and practically all users results from the promise by the Commission and
the Council that only judges with the highest qualification and experience in
patent law should deal with patent litigation between private parties, so that an
involvement of the ECJ beyond the EU legal order as it exists today should be
avoided, otherwise the entire project could be endangered. Users request an effi-
cient and predictable procedure before highly experienced judges which they
would not get in proceedings which would include referrals on substantive law
to the ECJ.”
The explanations of P. Veron in the European Parliament in 2011 are much
more candid. “The third concern of the patent users is that the new system
should not allow too many recourses, notably to the ECJ which is not the best
82. “Certains milieux d’affaires ne souhaitent pas vraiment un tel contrôle, craignant que la Cour ne soit
pas réellement préparée à la spécificité du contentieux des brevets ni suffisamment réceptive aux intérêts
des entreprises”, G. Triet et M. Vivant, Juridiction européenne: une nouvelle donne pour le brevet?, Cah-
iers de droit de l’entreprise, Janvier 2012, n° 1, dossier 4
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court to have the final word about each and every patent infringement case in
Europe; this means not only that the ECJ should not be a third instance court
(cassation court) for patent cases; it also means that the ECJ should not have to
rule on matters related to patent law which do not directly involve the EU legal
order. The patent community unanimous believes that the ECJ should not decide
on matters like novelty, inventive step and infringement; these are areas where
hands-on experience of patent litigation is vital. If I may tease you, I would say
that practitioners do believe that predictability is more important than
justice”83. One might prefer the absolute clarity of the UK Chartered Institute
of Patent Attorneys: “The CJEU must not decide European patent infringement
law. They do not have the specialist expertise and are not suited to it. References
to the CJEU lead to further expense and delay. This is also a further ceding of
sovereignty to Europe, without justification” 84. The first prize for these
comments could go the EPLAW President’s 2011 report: “If one wants a really
unattractive, inefficient, unpredictable and probably extremely expensive patent
court system, then we will get it; one must only give the ECJ a chance to receive
as many referrals in patent law as possible. If one wants to see substantive patent
law in Europe to be decided by judges without any solid knowledge and experi-
ence in this field, then one must involve the ECJ whenever possible.”85 Interest-
ingly, some of these practitioners tend to present their community as ‘unani-
mous’ when the reading of many comments reflects on the contrary a divided
one.
These drastic words are matched by the drastic words of the Court of Justice in
its 2011 proposal for a revision of its own Statute. In this proposal, the Court
has excluded in categorical terms any creation of an EU specialized court, for
the sake of legal coherence86. According to the Treaties, any creation of a
specialized court implies the transfer of appeals to the General Court. For the
Court, this would logically also require the transfer of prejudicial rulings to the
General Court, also allowed by the Treaties. As the Court is not satisfied with
the review process provided in such cases by the Treaty of Nice, it concludes:
“review is not, therefore, an appropriate tool for ensuring consistency of case-
law other than in relation to important issues of principle.” In matters of prelim-
inary rulings, it adds: “the advantages, in terms of consistency in the case-law
on trademarks, are slight in comparison with the negative repercussions of such
83. P. Veron, What model for the jurisdictional system for patent disputes in Europe?, European Parlia-
ment – Committee on Legal Affairs, Public hearing – Brussels 11 October 2011.
84. Briefing paper on European patent law proposals – Unitary European Patent and Unified Patents
Court (6 December 2011), p. 5.
http://www.cipa.org.uk/pages/whatsnew/article?D97A217E-AD81-4766-9981-EE84D944A1E5 (accessed
15 March 2013).
85. http://www.eplaw.org/Downloads/President’s%20Report.pdf (accessed 30 September 2013).
86. Proposition of 28 March 2011.
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-04/projet_en.pdf (accessed 21 May 2013).
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a transfer on other areas, such as the internal market – including, in particular,
the free movement of goods – or the principles applicable to references for a
preliminary ruling as such”87. This categorical opposition has strong systemic
consequences. Specialized courts, as revealed by the analysis of the unified
patent court agreement, could offer much more flexibility in terms of the
appointment and specialization of judges and staff, of procedure and of transla-
tion. They could permit certain specific needs of companies to be taken into
consideration in a more satisfactory manner. Furthermore, they could bring
increased productivity and reduced costs88.
This evokes somewhat a dialogue of the deaf. On one hand, some representa-
tives of the patent specialists’ community seem to desire a harmonization of the
effects of patents in the single market… but without the constraints of EU law,
as well as review by a court… but without any interference of the Court of
Justice. The desire for specialized judges is quite understandable, but the refusal
to give the Court of Justice any jurisdiction is much less so. One sometimes gets
the feeling that what is being claimed so loudly is in fact a real single market
with a simultaneous opt-out from all EU judicial review. Though patents are
important, free circulation, competition, and fundamental rights are also impor-
tant, and a balance must be found between all of them89. This is the mission of
the Court of Justice.
On the other hand, the Court of Justice seems eager to expand without limit
generalist courts, in spite of their numerous constraints, rigidities and costs.
Patents provide a marvelous example of the dead end brought about by a
systematic refusal to recognize any need for specialization. The accumulation of
these rejections can only result in the establishment of a real oxymoron of the
EU law. A court which does not belong to the EU, but is meant to implement EU
law, has to combine substantive rules about the same topic defined (a) in the EU
Treaties, (b) in a Treaty concluded between some of the Member States and
some third countries, (c) a Treaty concluded by some of the Member States, (d)
specific EU enhanced regulations covering some of the Member States (but a
different group from the previous group), (e) other EU regulations and (f)
various national legislations of reference.
87. Another reason of this opposition could be that the expansion of a three level judicial system could
also provoke a reform of the institution’s governance system, which remains a very sensitive question (see
§ 6.3). The link between the two topics has however never been explicitly made until now.
88. For more detailed comments, see F. Dehousse, The reform of the EU courts – The need of a manage-
ment approach, TEPSA/Egmont Paper n° 53, 2011, § 4.
For example, a brief analysis of the budgets indicates that the productivity of the cabinets’ personnel is
more or less 2,5 higher in the Civil Service Tribunal than in the Court of Justice. Additionally, the costs
per unit are lower.
89. About this, see also T. Jaeger, Shielding the unitary patent from the ECJ: a rash and futile exercise,
IIC, 2013, pp. 389-391.
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The final – and most paradoxical – result of this extremely complex maze could
be to require more intervention by the Court of Justice in the future, an outcome
which is most probably desired by nobody.
After decades of negotiations, the conclusion in the EU of different agreements
on patents can only inspire mixed feelings. On one hand, so much effort was
invested for so long that any solution brings relief. On the other hand, the
extreme complexity of the new system may also generate doubt and frustration.
One must never forget that this colossal work is meant to simplify the life of the
European entrepreneurs (meaning those who register patents as well as those
who challenge them). From this point of view, the texts do not make comforting
reading.
One can easily draw a first conclusion: this is certainly not the end of the saga.
The UPCA must be ratified. Numerous acts will have to be adopted to allow its
entry into force90. Many new mechanisms will have to be tested. Finally,
according to the author, important corrections will be required at the end of the
whole process.
From the institutional point of view, the unified patent court offers a magnifi-
cent illustration of the extreme level of complexity which the European Union
has reached in the last few years. Of course, the deep and broad integration of
so many States, which are so different, and with a population of nearly half a
billion people, is an extraordinarily ambitious objective. Complexity is inevi-
table. However, a part at least of the system’s complexity seems to come not
from functional requirements, but from various misunderstandings and inabili-
ties to compromise.
From the judicial point of view, the chosen approach reflects a persistent suspi-
cion of the Court of Justice in some patent specialists circles, and also in some
Member States. It also reflects the consistently hostile attitude of the Court of
Justice to the creation of any new EU specialized court. Corporatist, national
and/or cultural reasons seem to explain a quite generalized resistance to change.
Another, possibly more efficient, solution could in fact have been envisaged. For
this, however, the different parties involved would have needed to compromise.
The Court of Justice could have accepted the possibility of creating new special-
ized courts in targeted domains, and explored different solutions, already avail-
able, to protect the coherence of the case-law. The Member States could have
opted for the advantages of a fully-fledged EU specialized court, examined the
possible simplification of the procedural constraints of such a court, and also
explored means to improve the present (in)stability of the EU courts. Finally, in
90. On this, see the roadmap adopted in 2013 by the preparatory committee:
http://www.unified-patent-court.org/images/documents/roadmap.pdf (accessed 10 October 2013).
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that framework, the patent specialists could have accepted some concessions for
the sake of a broader and much simpler protection of patent rights at the EU
level, and for the coherence of the whole EU legal system. However, the new
system will require time to become fully operational. Some adaptation could
become possible anyway in the future.
In that perspective, there is a real need to deepen the analysis of the simplifica-
tions that could result from the creation of EU specialized courts. Though this
has not been done until now, it is important to connect the two negotiations
concerning the unified patent court and the revision of the statute of the Court
of Justice of the European Union91.
One needs to come back to the basics, and forget prejudiced ideas. Since the
1970s, some basic elements seem to be accepted. A harmonized protection of
patents could offer serious benefits to inventors, and to the business system
which supports them. Such harmonization cannot be dissociated from the crea-
tion of a common court. It can however cohabit with a partial decentralization
to the level of the Member States. The protection of all interests involved
requires simplified procedures and highly qualified judges. It would maybe be
simpler to begin with the existing EU legislation and judicial system, and then
try to adapt them to those specific requirements. EU law offers already the
required flexibility. It would be superbly ironic to see in the end the repeated
failure of an efficient protection of patents, crucial for European competitive-
ness, due to … a lack of inventiveness.
91. On this, see F. Dehousse, La nécessité d’une approche managériale de la réforme des cours
européennes – Quelques questions après 18 mois de débat législatif sur la réforme du tribunal, Université
de Paris, 26 oct. 2012. (to be published).

